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Abstract
Decentralized systems such as blockchains promise to fun-
damentally change how untrusted parties exchange data and
assets. A key challenge in the decentralized setting is scalably
authenticating data in the system. Merkle Patricia trees (MPT)
are widely used in decentralized systems like Ethereum, to
verify that the data is correct and up-to-date. Unfortunately,
MPTs incur significant overhead due to random IO oper-
ations, serialization, and hashing. This paper presents the
Distributed Merkle Patrica Tree (DMPT), a novel data struc-
ture that reduces the overheads of the MPT. A DMPT verti-
cally shards the MPT across the memory of multiple nodes,
eliminating the IO bottleneck. DMPTS reduce network band-
width utilization using a combination of novel techniques
such as witness compaction and node bagging. Compared
to the MPT used in Ethereum, put and get operations in the
DMPT achieve 80–160× better throughput, even when the
Ethereum MPT is stored in memory. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of DMPTS by building FVCHAIN, a modified
version of Ethereum which uses DMPT instead of MPT. In a
four-region geo-distributed deployment, FVCHAIN can verify
20,000 transactions per second (20× higher than Ethereum).
1 Introduction
Authenticated data structures such as Merkle trees [37] are
widely used in file systems (ext4 [17], ZFS [1]), mobile stor-
age systems (Android boot partition [23, 24]), and decentral-
ized systems (Ethereum [53]). They are used to efficiently
verify that a given data item belongs to a large data set, and
to ensure that the data set as a whole has not been tampered
with. Since the integrity verification happens in the critical
path before the data is provided to the user, the performance
of these data structures significantly affects the overall perfor-
mance of the system; for example, the Ethereum developer
community is working to increase Merkle Tree performance
since it limits overall throughput [22, 36, 44, 45].
While authenticated data structures are actively researched
on [13, 26, 30, 31, 34, 38, 42, 43, 46, 48], Merkle trees and
their variants remain the most commonly used authenticated
data structure. A Merkle tree constructs a tree of hashes over
an ordered list of data items. The data are at the leaves, and
each inner node is the hash of its children. Thus, a change in
any node is propagated all the way to the root node. The root
hash serves a concise representation of the data set.
Unfortunately, Merkle trees suffer from high overhead due
to poor IO performance and expensive hashing and serial-
ization operations. Verifying a data item belongs to the set
requires reading all the nodes from the leaf to the root, caus-
ing a number of random reads. Similarly, updating a data item
involves updating a path from leaf to root, leading to ran-
dom writes. Merkle trees are often serialized using encodings
like Recursive Length Prefix (RLP) [12], and are stored in a
key-value store such as LevelDB [29], which further exacer-
bates the problem due to read and write amplification [47, 48].
Apart from the storage bottlenecks, serialization and hashing
of Merkle tree nodes also contribute to the overhead. As a
result, Merkle tree implementations get poor overall perfor-
mance. For example, the Ethereum Merkle tree variant (the
Merkle Patricia Tree) can only perform 1400 gets per second,
even when it is stored in memory.
This paper presents the DMPT, a novel authenticated data
structure that aims to reduce the storage and computation over-
heads of Merkle trees and their variants. The DMPT builds
on a type of Merkle tree termed the Merkle Patrica Tree, and
turns it into a distributed, sharded data structure that offers
transactional capabilities to applications. The DMPT elimi-
nates storage overhead by storing the entire tree in memory.
The in-memory representation is optimized by using memory
pointers for navigation (instead of hashes). Computational
overhead from hashing and serializing of Merkle tree nodes
is reduced using a collection of novel techniques such as lazy
hash resolution and hash memoization. DMPT employs verti-
cal sharding, where the tree is sharded (each shard is a direct
child of the root) and stored in the memory of a different node.
Since both reads and writes in Merkle trees operate on a verti-
cal path down the tree, vertical sharding enables parallel reads
and writes on different nodes. DMPTS associate a cache with
each application which stores the top of the tree and recently
accessed items. DMPTS use the cache in conjunction with
techniques like witness compaction to reduce the network
traffic between the application cache and the storage nodes.
As a result of the careful design and optimizations, DMPTS
achieve a performance of over 210,000 gets/second on a sin-
gle node, 150× higher than the Ethereum Merkle Patricia tree
even when it is stored in memory.
To demonstrate the utility of DMPTS for real applications,
we built FVCHAIN (Fast Verification blockchain), a version
of the Ethereum decentralized blockchain platform ported
to use DMPTS instead of Merkle Patricia Trees. Ethereum
verifies its transactions by checking each value that is read
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against the Merkle Patricia Tree. We modified the architec-
ture of FVCHAIN to take full advantage of the high throughput
and parallelism offered by DMPTS. Users submit transactions
to a FVCHAIN client. The client then performs speculative
pre-execution on the transactions, verifying the reads of each
transaction by contacting the DMPT storage nodes. For each
verified read, the client obtains a proof called the witness from
the storage shard. Several clients can perform the IO-intensive
step of speculative pre-execution in parallel, talking to dif-
ferent storage shards. The client then submits the transaction
and the witnesses to the miner. The miner can verify the trans-
action using the witness, without contacting the storage nodes
or performing IO; this is key to fast verification. The miner
executes the transaction, applies the result of the transaction
to its DMPT cache, and then updates the DMPT storage nodes.
FVCHAIN has the same trust assumptions as Ethereum: dif-
ferent components such as miners and storage shards do not
trust each other.
To evaluate FVCHAIN, we generate synthetic workloads
that mirror transactions on the Ethereum mainnet blockchain.
We analyzed Ethereum transactions and observed that the ac-
counts involved in transactions have a zipf distribution: 90%
of transactions involve the same 10% of accounts. We ob-
served that only 10–15% of Ethereum transactions involved
smart contracts. Our workload generator faithfully reproduces
these distributions in its transactions. We evaluated FVCHAIN
using this workload and found it could verify 30,000 transac-
tions per second in a single node setting, and 20,000 transac-
tions per second in a geo-distributed setting with four regions
spread across three continents.
We would like to stress that FVCHAIN is only a proof-
of-concept prototype built to evaluate the performance and
utility of DMPTS. It is not a mature blockchain framework
that can be compared to Ethereum. It is encouraging that
FVCHAIN has a high verification throughput; this indicates
that the Merkle tree is no longer the bottleneck for overall
throughput. DMPTS could enable Ethereum to target different
designs, such as packing more transactions into large blocks;
this was previously prevented by the slow verification speed
of the Ethereum Merkle Patricia Tree. However, more work is
required to identify all the implications of such a design; our
focus in this work is to merely demonstrate that such designs
are possible using DMPTS.
The DMPT data structure are not without limitations.
DMPTS depend upon the application for availability and fault
tolerance. As DMPT creates multiple versions of data items
for concurrency control, effective garbage collection is cru-
cial for reclaiming space; if the abort rate increases, garbage
collection may stall the system. Despite these limitations,
DMPTS represent an interesting new point in the design space
of authenticated data structures.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• An empirical analysis of Ethereum performance show-
ing that authentication using Merkle Patricia Trees is a
significant bottleneck (§2).
• The design and implementation of the novel DMPT, an
authenticated data structure (§3).
• The architecture and implementation of the FVCHAIN
decentralized blockchain framework which demonstrates
how to effectively utilize DMPTS (§4).
• A workload generator for Ethereum transactions based
on analysis of Ethereum transactions, and an empirical
evaluation of DMPTS and FVCHAIN (§5).
2 Background
In this section, we provide some background on authenti-
cated data structures and their overheads. We first describe
the Merkle tree variant used by Ethereum, the Merkle Patricia
Tree (MPT) (§2.1). We then experimentally show that the
poor IO performance of MPTs is a significant bottleneck for
Ethereum (§2.2).
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Figure 1: Merkle Patricia Tree. Nodes A and C are branch
nodes, B and D are extension nodes, and the rest are leaf
nodes. These nodes are stored in a key-value store keyed by
their hash, which randomizes their location on disk. Reading
the account 626 for example, would require reading node A,
looking up C using h(C), then looking up F using h(F).
2.1 Merkle Patricia Trees
A Merkle Patricia Tree (MPT) is a combination of the Merkle
tree [37] and Patricia tree data structures. The MPT constructs
a tree of hashes on an ordered list of key-value pairs. The MPT
stores one character of the key at each level. Each node can
have multiple children. Keys with common prefix share paths
in the tree. The non-leaf nodes in a MPT store the hashes of
their children. The root hash reflects changes to any of the
values as it hashes the entire list. The root hash thus represents
the entire list with a unique constant-sized root hash.
MPTs can prove that a value exists in the list by providing
a witness: for each node in the path from the leaf node to
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(a) Storage I/O overhead (b) Network IO overhead (c) Time taken to verify blocks
Figure 2: Overheads of Ethereum’s MPT.. This figure highlights the storage, network, and verification overheads caused by
the MPT in Ethereum. It shows the large number of IO operations required to sync a block, the size of witnesses required (that
must be transmitted over the network) per block, and how increasing number of IO operations increase the block verification
time. We use parity 2.2.11 to sync a full node to Ethereum mainnet blockchain for collecting the above data.
the root, the witness contains its sibling hashes required to
recompute its parent hash. A witness is verified against a
root-hash: if recalculating the hashes from the leaf to the root
results in the given root hash, the value belongs in the list
represented in the root hash.
Modified MPT. The classical MPT data structure is ineffi-
cient since it stores a single character of the key at each level.
For example, if the key is 64 hex characters long, a Patricia
tree is 64 nodes deep, requiring a kilobyte of extra space to
store one node per character at each level, and takes full 64
steps for a lookup or a delete operation. The modified MPT
solves this problem by introducing three types of nodes: the
branch node, the extension node, and the leaf node. A branch
node has 16 branches (one branch per hex character, keys are
hex strings), and a value. An extension node stores a string
of characters encoding a path without branches in the tree,
and a pointer to the next node. A leaf node stores the remain-
ing characters in a key and the value. These different nodes
compress the unique paths, resulting in an efficient modified
Patricia tree, as shown in the Figure 1. Ethereum uses the
modified MPT, that employs Recursive Length Prefix [12]
encoding for serializing its nodes and secure KECCACK-256
for hashing the serialized nodes.
2.2 Overheads of Ethereum MPT
We analyze the costs of the Ethereum MPT in terms of stor-
age IO and network IO. We also analyze the data structure’s
impact on Ethereum verification time. We employ a widely-
used Ethereum blockchain client, Parity 2.2.11 [10], in our
experiments. We use Parity to sync a Ethereum full node and
measure the various costs.
Storage IO cost. We find that verifying a single block with
around 100 transactions results in over 10K random I/Os from
reading nodes in the MPT. Figure 2 (a) shows the number
of IO operations incurred during the sync of various blocks
in the Ethereum blockchain; most of these IO operations are
incurred due to the MPT. Ethereum’s MPT is stored using the
LevelDB [29] key-value store, which amplifies the read and
write cost further [47, 48].
Network IO cost. Figure 2 (b) shows the witness size re-
quired for verifying each block in the Ethereum blockchain.
These witnesses would need to be transmitted over the net-
work. In Ethereum where secure, 256-bit hashes are used, the
witness for a single read of a 100 byte account can be around
4KB, an overhead of 40×. The witness size also increases
over time as the total data in Ethereum increases.
The spikes in the Figure 2 (a) and (b) are the result of
a DDOS attack [52] on the Ethereum’s world state, which
created accounts with no balances, increasing the values in
the MPT and thereby reducing the transaction execution and
verification rate on the Ethereum state.
Verification time. Verifying a block involves checking that
each transaction in the block is correct, and that executing
the transactions lead to the world state summarized by the
root hash embedded in the block. As verification involves
reading witnesses from storage, verification is affected by the
storage overhead mentioned above. Processing an Ethereum
block with about 100 transactions takes hundreds of millisec-
onds due to the I/O operations required, even on a datacenter-
grade NVMe SSD. Figure 2 (c) shows the time taken to
sync Ethereum blocks along with number of IO operations
required.
2.3 Summary
Though we analyze the Ethereum implementation of the MPT,
our analysis is generally applicable to any implementation
of the MPT or the Merkle tree. The MPT incurs significant
overhead in terms of storage IO and network IO. This over-
head will increase as the total amount of data served by the
data structure increases. Our analysis also shows that the per-
formance of these data structures significantly affects overall
application throughput, since verification happens in the crit-
ical path. Thus, the challenge is to design an authenticated
data structure that avoids the overheads experienced by the
Ethereum MPT and offers high read and write throughput.
3
3 DMPTs
This section presents the DMPT, a novel distributed, authenti-
cated data structure that seeks to eliminate the overheads of
MPTs and Merkle trees.
3.1 Goals
Fast authentication. Creating and verifying witnesses should
be fast and efficient, avoiding storage IO, serialization, and
hashing overheads.
Scalability. As the amount of data increases, we should be
able to add nodes to DMPTS to maintain or increase overall
throughput.
High concurrency. DMPTS should achieve a high degree
of concurrency, allowing multiple simultaneous readers and
writers. DMPTS should provide consistent snapshots to appli-
cations.
Low network overhead. DMPTS should minimize both coor-
dination among components and utilization of network band-
width.
3.2 Overview
The DMPT is a distributed authenticated data structure built
on top of the modified Merkle Patricia Tree used by Ethereum.
DMPT is designed to avoid the storage and network overheads
caused by MPTs. DMPTS distribute the authenticated data
without compromising safety.
DMPTS use three main techniques to achieve the design
goals. First, DMPTS store the entire authenticated data struc-
ture in memory, rather than on solid state drives or magnetic
hard drives. DMPTS use an optimized representation for the
in-memory data: using memory pointers instead of hashes,
and reducing serialization and hashing overhead using tech-
niques like hash memoization and lazy hash resolution.
Second, DMPTS shard the tree vertically across multiple
nodes. Vertical sharding is particularly suitable for DMPTS be-
cause witness creation and verification require vertical slices
of the tree; these operations do not require nodes across the
width of the tree. Operations can happen in parallel across
vertical shards as long as conflicts are resolved at the root.
Sharding also allows DMPTS to scale beyond the memory
capacity of a single machine.
Finally, DMPTS employ caching and witness compaction
to reduce the size of the witness transmitted over the network.
DMPTS provide a cache for each application node that caches
the top part of the DMPT, and storage nodes only send the
un-cached part of the witness to the application. The size of
the cache provides a configurable knob for trading memory
consumption for network bandwidth utilization.
DMPTS provide support for ACID transactions with serial-
izability. Transactions build on the snapshot they read at the
start of the transaction. DMPTS are able to provide high con-
currency for writers as they employ a form of multi-version
concurrency control. The commit of a transaction results in
API Function
beginTx() =
tx-root-hash
Begins the transactional context
for further operations.
get(key,
[root-hash]) =
value, witness
Return the value associated with
given key in transactional snap-
shot or optional root-hash snap-
shot.
put(key, value,
[root-hash]) =
status
Inserts or updates the key-value
pair in the context of the transac-
tional snapshot or optional root-
hash snapshot.
verify(key,
value, witness,
root-hash) = status
Verifies the given key-value pair
in the root-hash snapshot using
the given witness.
endTx(txroot) =
status, new-tx-root
Commits or aborts a transaction.
If committed, returns the root-
hash of the new snapshot.
Table 1: API. The table lists DMPT operations.
a new snapshot of the tree; concurrent writers produce dif-
ferent snapshots which can be resolved by the application.
DMPTS do not require the use of locks across its distributed
nodes, yet provide strong, meaningful isolation guarantees to
applications.
The design of the DMPT argues that a large random-access
data structure can get higher throughput by serving it from
memory over a network than serving it from local storage
with a small memory cache. While RAMCloud [41] proposed
a similar design for low latency, DMPTS employ it to obtain
high throughput. The design takes advantage of the nature
of a Merkle Patricia tree: the cache-friendliness of the top
of the tree, and the fact that witness creation only requires a
vertical slice of the tree. Finally, the design also argues that
it is better to create witnesses once and serve them over the
network rather than create them on demand from local storage.
Overall, DMPTS present a new point in the design space of
authenticated data structures.
3.3 API
Table 1 presents the API of DMPTS. DMPTS provide the stan-
dard authenticated operations of get, put, and verify. Addition-
ally, DMPTS provide ACID transactions with serializability
to support applications that require transactional gurantees.
3.4 Optimized In-Memory Representation
We observed that when the Merkle Patricia Tree is flattened
and stored in a key-value store, there is significant overhead.
This overhead comes both from the random read and write
IO operations, and the serialization and hashing that must be
performed when reading from or writing to storage.
To reduce these overheads, DMPTS store the tree in mem-
ory. We observed that merely storing the tree in an in-memory
key-value store was not enough; the serialization and hashing
overheads were as significant as the cost of doing random IO
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to an SSD (§5.2). Thus, DMPTS use an optimized in-memory
representation for storing the tree.
Using pointers for navigation. DMPTS do not use node
hashes for navigation; navigation is performed using sim-
ple in-memory pointers. When compared to the commonly
used 256-bit hashes, using 64-bit memory pointers reduces
the size of a node pointer by 4×. Using memory pointers al-
lows traversing a DMPT without computing the node hashes.
An in-memory DMPT enables fast tree traversal improving
the performance of reads and updates.
Optimizations. DMPTS include two optimizations for up-
dates which reduce expensive hash calculations. First, DMPTS
employ lazy hash resolution: when an update is performed,
the tree is not updated (by rehashing each node) all the way
from the leaf to the root. The hashes are only calculated when
the transaction commits (endTx) or when the DMPT is read
using get(). This improves write performance at the cost
of making the first later read slower. Lazy hash resolution is
particularly effective if there are many writes between read
operations. Second, DMPTS employ hash memoization to
avoid re-hashing nodes if they have not changed. On the up-
date path, DMPTS mark the nodes that are modified which
need to be re-hashed. Using this book-keeping information,
DMPTS optimize the root hash computation by re-using the
previously computed node hashes of unmodified nodes and
recomputing the hashes of only the modified nodes, called
hash memoization.
3.5 DMPT Architecture
The DMPT is made of two main components: sharded storage
nodes, and a cache that is associated with each application
node. Both components use the optimized in-memory repre-
sentation described above.
3.5.1 Sharded In-Memory Storage
DMPTS shard the tree vertically across multiple nodes. Since
the size of the tree may grow larger than the memory available
in a single node, DMPTS divide the tree vertically into shards
(subtrees starting with a direct child of the root), and place
each shard on a different machine. The number of shards is
configurable (default: 16).
Vertical sharding enables DMPTS to create witnesses in
parallel. As witnesses are vertical paths down the tree, and the
DMPT shards contain vertical slices of the tree, constructing
a witness does not require any communication with other
shards. As a result, witness creation can proceed in parallel
and scales with the number of shards.
3.5.2 Application Caches
DMPTS associate an in-memory cache with the application
that caches the top part of the tree. The cache stores the top
part of the tree (that changes more often) and the recently
accessed witnesses (vertical paths down the tree). The cache
understands the DMPT structure and access patterns, unlike
caches provided by key-value stores such as RocksDB which
may only cache recently accessed nodes.
The caches are crucial to the good performance of DMPTS
and form its working space: all updates are first applied to the
cache of the updating node, and then sent out to the shards.
All reads are served from the cache; if there is a cache miss,
the data is fetched from the shards, the cache is populated, and
the read is served. Thus, each application obtains a compact,
consistent, and authenticated view of the data through the
DMPT cache.
If the application is decentralized, there may be multiple
application nodes each with their own DMPT cache operating
on the same shards. The DMPT caches at different applica-
tion nodes may have a different view of the underlying data,
depending on what is cached. If two application nodes write
concurrently, they will see different, consistent snapshots of
the underlying data. We explain the isolation guarantees pro-
vided by DMPTS in Section 3.6. Applications need to use
external mechanisms to synchronize the contents of their
cache.
Pruning. The DMPT caches can be pruned to reclaim mem-
ory. They provide a configurable parameter called the reten-
tion level r. A prune operation discards all the nodes beyond
r by replacing the nodes in the level (r+1) with hash nodes.
Hash nodes store a single hash of the node that is pruned; the
hash is used to fetch the node from storage. As the DMPT
cache uses memory pointers, hash nodes provide a mechanism
to identify nodes in a machine-independent fashion. Pruning
allows DMPTS to efficiently cache witnesses by constructing
a partial tree.
Reducing Witness Size. As data gets added to the DMPT,
the size of the witnesses increase. To reduce the size of the
witnesses transmitted over the network, DMPTS use a tech-
nique termed witness compaction. Witness compaction works
in conjunction with the cache to reduce the size of witnesses.
Since the application cache has the most up-to-date version of
cached nodes, the shards only need to send the un-cached part
of the witness, termed a compact witness, to the application.
Witness for multiple items are collected together and sent in a
node bag, which eliminates node duplicates across witnesses.
3.6 Concurrency Control
DMPTS provide ACID transactions with serializability. Con-
currency control in DMPT does not require distributed locks
though concurrent transactions read from and write multiple
shards. DMPTS take advantage of the fact that every transac-
tion creates new versions of the key-value pairs; there are no
in-place updates.
Every transaction operates on top of a snapshot of the tree.
The snapshot for a transaction is fixed when the transaction is
created. All reads for the transaction return values from this
snapshot, regardless of other concurrent transactions.
Every transaction creates a unique snapshot when it com-
mits, with new nodes in the DMPT. As a result, concurrent
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transactions do not interfere with each other.
3.7 DMPT Operations
Transaction Begin. txBegin() = tx-root. When the
transaction begins, the latest committed transaction root hash
at the application cache is used as the transaction snapshot,
and returned as tx-root. Gets in the transaction return values
from the transactional snapshot.
Get. get(key, [root-hash]) = value, [witness].
Gets return key-value pairs from the transactional snapshot
or if provided, from root-hash. Gets may optionally return
a witness to the application. If the values and witnesses are
not present in the application cache, they are retrieved from
the storage shards and added to the cache.
Put. put(key, value, [root-hash]) = status. A put
adds a new node to the application cache. The path from the
leaf to the root is not immediately recalculated, due to lazy
hash resolution. This results in fast put operations.
Verify. verify(key, value, witness, root-hash) =
status. Verify uses the supplied key-value pair and witness
to verify whether the key-pair belongs to the root-hash. In
the common case, verify does not cause any reads at the stor-
age shards.
Transaction End. endTx(tx-root) = status,
new-tx-root. When the transaction ends, the new
hash root new-tx-root is calculated based on all puts
performed in the transaction. The updates are first logged
and applied to the application cache. The new-tx-root is
provided to the application, and the application’s replication
protocol is triggered to send the updates to other replicas;
in parallel, the updates are sent to the shards. When the
replication protocol completes, the transaction is durably
committed. If replication among application caches fail, the
transaction is aborted, and new-tx-root is discarded and
later garbage-collected.
3.8 Availability and Fault Tolerance
DMPTS depend on the distributed application for availabil-
ity and fault tolerance. The application ensures that at least
one replica will always be available, and that the replicas
agree on the root hash of the last committed transaction. The
application is free to use any replication and consensus pro-
tocol as long as this guarantee is provided. Since the DMPT
caches are embedded in the application replicas, they inherit
the availability and fault tolerance guarantees.
DMPTS have novel failure-recovery mechanisms: if the
storage shards lose their data due to a crash, they recover
from the caches (instead of caches recovering from storage
shards). This is because caches are the authoritative source of
data, receiving updates before the storage shards. Each cache
has a write-ahead-log where logical updates are persisted;
this is used to reconstruct a shard that has lost data. The
caches reconstruct data from other replicas if they lose data.
The application’s availability guarantee ensures at least one
replica will be accessible.
3.9 Tuning
The performance of DMPTS can be tuned based on a single
parameter r: the retention level of the DMPT cache at the
application. This parameter affects the size of the compact
witnesses transmitted over the network. A higher r results
in better performance and lower network utilization, but will
require more memory for the cache.
4 FVCHAIN
To demonstrate the utility of DMPTS, we build FVCHAIN, a
version of Ethereum modified to use DMPTS.
Overview. Ethereum suffers from two major problems: min-
ers maintain the large authenticated state on-disk locally , and
perform expensive IO in the critical path of transaction exe-
cution. FVCHAIN tackles both the problems by replacing the
local on-disk MPT in Ethereum with DMPTS, and introducing
speculatively pre-executing clients which perform IO prior
to transaction execution. FVCHAIN achieves high transaction
throughput by parallelizing the IO on DMPTS using multiple
clients, and with novel techniques like witness revision, that
maximize its overall transaction throughput.
Our goal in building FVCHAIN was to demonstrate that
DMPTS could potentially be used to increase the throughput
of blockchain platforms. The public nature of Ethereum along
with its support for complex smart contracts make it an ideal
use case for DMPTS. FVCHAIN is a not a mature system that
is a replacement for Ethereum; the implications of our design
choices needs to be examined further.
We first provide background on Ethereum, then describe
the architecture of FVCHAIN, discuss its security and trust
assumptions, and finally discuss possible bottlenecks arising
from the design.
4.1 Ethereum Overview
Ethereum [5, 53] is as a decentralized service which provides
its users access to a database known as the world state. The
world state consist of a mapping between an address and
accounts or smart contracts.
Transactions. To transfer funds to another account, the ac-
count owner sends a message with the payment to a desti-
nation address. If the destination is a smart contract, it is
executed. The message is signed with the owner’s private
key, and sent to the Ethereum transaction pool (txpool) via
a gossip protocol. Participants in Ethereum known as min-
ers select transactions from the txpool and assemble them
into blocks, chained together using Proof-of-Work consen-
sus. These blocks become part of the blockchain that can be
replayed to reproduce the world state.
Ethereum stores the world state in a modified Merkle Pa-
tricia Tree. Miners include a Merkle tree root hash for the
world state in additions to transactions in each block. The
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Merkle root hash is broadcast to all participants in the system,
and allows miners to prove that an account balance exists
in the world state. The keys in the MPT are address hashes.
KECCAK-256 hashing is used to transform keys into uni-
formly distributed 32-byte values. Witnesses can be large in
the MPT: for a tree of height 10, a witness for a 100 byte
account is typically around 4KB, resulting in a 40× size over-
head for authentication. Updating a leaf node requires re-
hashing it and updating each node to the root, resulting in
significant amount of random I/O [22, 36, 44, 45, 54].
The quest for higher throughput. While the Proof of
Work [25, 40] consensus used by Ethereum regulates the
block creation rate to approximately one block every 10 sec-
onds, consensus does not limit the number of transactions per
block, or the block size. The block size is limited mainly by
the block verification time.
Larger blocks will lead to higher verification times due
to the additional IO required. Verification is carried out by
each Ethereum node in the critical path; verification must be
completed before the block can be accepted and sent to other
Ethereum nodes. Higher block verification times causes in-
creased forking, compromising the safety and live-ness of the
blockchain. Ethereum strives to have each block be received
and verified by a majority of the nodes in 10–12 seconds [49].
The block size is kept small lest the verification time increase
beyond acceptable levels [54].
The stateless client proposal [19] from Ethereum replaces
local storage IO with network IO from servers that maintain
the world state. This proposal would require that witnesses
be sent over the network. As shown in Figure 2 (b), witness
sizes are increasing over time, so this proposal would lead to
unacceptable network bandwidth utilization.
If Ethereum could be modified to have large blocks without
increasing verification time or placing a large strain on the
network, Ethereum would have high transaction throughput
(even though the block creation rate is fixed by the Proof-
of-Work consensus). DMPTS enable this point in the design
spectrum; we build FVCHAIN to demonstrate the idea.
4.2 Architecture
Figure 3 illustrates the novel architecture of FVCHAIN.
FVCHAIN has three components: the storage nodes, the clients,
and the miners. The local storage in Ethereum’s miners is re-
placed by the caches and storage shards of DMPT. The clients
read data from DMPT shards, and submit transactions (along
with witnesses for transaction data) to the miners. Each miner
has an associated DMPT cache. The miners verify and execute
transactions, and update their DMPT cache and the DMPT
storage shards.
The FVCHAIN architecture maximizes parallelism. Several
clients can read from different shards at the same time. Clients
submit both transactions and witnesses to the miners; in the
common case, the miners do not have to perform reads at
the storage nodes. As a result, the miners are not disk IO-
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Figure 3: FVCHAIN architecture. Clients speculatively pre-
execute transactions, reading witnesses from DMPT shards.
The clients submit transactions and witnesses to the miners.
The miners then update the DMPT shards.
bound, verifying and executing transactions efficiently. Once a
transaction is executed, miners update their application cache
first, and then update the storage nodes. Only clients block
for IO when collecting data and witnesses for transactions.
However, as clients are performing IO in parallel, the overall
throughput of the system is high.
4.2.1 Storage nodes
Storage nodes in FVCHAIN each contain a DMPT shard.
FVCHAIN shards the total state in Ethereum based on the
first four bits of the key, and contains 16 shards.
Updates. Storage nodes receive updates from miners, corre-
sponding to the transactions in one block of the blockchain.
They apply the updates to their in-memory DMPT shard, re-
calculate the root hash, and confirm it matches the root hash
in the block supplied by the miner. They also verify the block
header and reject updates from invalid blocks.
Reads. Clients read account values from the storage nodes.
Storage nodes provide a witness node bag, a collection of
nodes comprising the witness for the read and the updated
accounts. Witness for multiple accounts are combined, remov-
ing the duplicate nodes. The storage nodes provide compact
witnesses based on the miner’s cache size.
Forks. Multiple miners can write different competing ver-
sions of the same block to the storage nodes at the same time.
This is termed a fork in the blockchain. The storage nodes
store both competing versions of the block. As the blockchain
grows, older forks which are not built on are discarded.
4.2.2 Speculative Pre-Execution by Clients
One of the novel aspects of FVCHAIN is how the clients oper-
ate. In Ethereum, miners perform IO for witness creation and
verification. In contrast, only clients perform IO in FVCHAIN
(in the common case). Clients contact storage nodes, collect
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1: function MIXGENES(mGenes, sGenes, curBlock)
2: uint256 randomN← curBlock.blockHash
3: randomN← KeccakHash(randomN,curBlock)
4: MemoryAry babyGenes← mix(mGenes,sGenes,randomN)
5: return babyGenes
Figure 4: Indeterminate contract values do not affect wit-
ness prefetching. Psuedocode of the CryptoKitties mixGenes
function. The function makes repeated calls to curBlock, the
block of the executed transaction. Because this is not known
at pre-execution time, the client substitutes an approximate
value, which doesn’t affect witness prefetching because these
numbers only affect written values in the function.
witnesses in the form of node bags, and submit transactions
and node bags to the miners. Miners can then verify transac-
tions without performing any IO, drastically increasing their
performance.
The client receives a transaction from the client. The client
speculatively pre-executes the transaction, reading values and
witnesses from the storage nodes. The execution is speculative
for two reasons. First, the miner does not trust the client.
Second, the transaction might use the timestamp or block
number of the block it appears in during execution. The miner
will re-execute the transaction again to maintain correctness.
The speculative pre-execution produces the witness node
bags for accounts and keys read in the transaction. The client
then sends the node bags along with the transactions to the
miner. The miner tolerates incorrect or incomplete node bags,
fetching node bags from the storage nodes as required.
Speculative Values. When the transaction depends on an ex-
ternal value such as the block number or the timestamp, the
client speculatively provides a value. We find that this is effec-
tive in obtaining the correct node bags from the storage nodes;
in other words, the inaccuracy introduced by guessing such
values does not significantly alter execution. For example, the
CryptoKitties mixGenes function repeatedly references the
current block number and its hash. Because these numbers
are only used to generate randomness of written values in the
function, substituting inaccurate values does not affect the
witnesses that are pre-fetched. For example, Figure 4 shows
an example of a function from the popular CryptoKitties con-
tract that repeatedly references the current block number and
its hash, where substituting inaccurate values does not affect
the witnesses that are prefetched.
Stale data. We make a similar observation that clients can
pre-execute with stale data and still prefetch the correct node
bags. For example, the CryptoKitties giveBirth function
is a fixed-address contract, where the addresses read (loads
from the kitties array) only depend on the inputs from the
message call. To deal with rare variable-address contracts, the
miner may asynchronously read from a storage node after the
transaction has been submitted. Even in these cases, the client
1: function GIVEBIRTH(matronId)
2: Kitty matron← kitties[matronId]
3: assert(matron.isValid)
4: assert(matron.isReadyToGiveBirth)
5:
6: Kitty sire← kitties[matron.sireId]
7: childGenes← mixGenes(matron.genes,sire.genes)
8: newKitty← createKitty(matron,sire,childGenes)
9: pregnantKitties−−
10: sender.send(birthFee)
11: return newKitty
Figure 5: Fixed-address contract example. Psuedocode of
the CryptoKitties giveBirth function, which indicates that
storage reads (accesses to the kitties array) only depend on
function arguments.
will have retrieved some of the correct nodes required for the
transaction (e.g., the to and from accounts).
Aborting transactions at the client. Another advantage of
the speculative pre-execution is that it can filter out transac-
tions that miners would abort. Contrast this with the Ethereum
blockchain, in which aborted transactions are no-ops, but still
take up valuable space in the public ledger. In FVCHAIN,
clients can prevent miners from spending valuable cycles
executing transactions that will be eventually aborted. The
tradeoff is that staleness might cause clients to abort transac-
tions conservatively. For example, in Figure 5, if the client
has a stale view of the matron kitty, it might abort on Line 5
if it believes the matron is not ready to give birth. If account
holders believe that a client has incorrectly aborted their trans-
action, they can send their transaction to other clients.
4.3 Miners
A miner’s task is to verify the transactions sent by the client,
execute the transactions, and update the storage nodes. There
are multiple miners in FVCHAIN. Each miner has its own
DMPT cache, which provides a compact, consistent, and au-
thenticated view of the FVCHAIN world state.
When a miner needs to read or update an account, it con-
sults both its DMPT cache and the node bag submitted by the
client. Miners exploit the Merkle tree for both authentication
and consistency. Verifying that an account value hashes to the
root of a block proves two things: that the value belongs to
that block, and that the value has not been tampered with.
The miner groups together transactions and mines a new
block. The miner informs other miners of the new block along
with the node-bag nodes required to process the block.
The miner then sends the block with a list of changes that
were made to storage nodes, which verify and process the
updates. The miner can then compact its in-memory tree by
pruning it to a configurable height in the tree.
Witness Revision. Miners while processing transactions may
end up with stale nodes in the node bags submitted by the
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Figure 6: Witness Revision. Transaction tx1 has been ap-
plied to DMPT cache, with the changed nodes shaded. When
tx2 arrives, node C is stale in its node bag. The miner auto-
matically revises this node during traversal, adopting node
C’ instead to reach hash node G, which it retrieves from the
node bag to fetch the leaf node for account 657.
clients. However, miners replace the stale nodes with more
up-to-date versions using the DMPT cache, as shown in Fig-
ure 6. After processing tx1, node C is modified to C’ but, the
node bag still has stale node C. The stale node prevents the
miner from processing tx2, which accesses node G. Uisng
witness revision, the miner revises the node bag to reflect
the recent changes, making it possible to reach Node G from
the modified node C’. With witness revision, miners process
transactions without relying on clients for the latest witnesses.
Witness revision can be explained with an analogy from
version control: it is similar to doing git push (trying to
upload your changes), finding out something else in the repos-
itory has changed, doing a git pull (obtaining the change in
the repository), merging and then doing a git push. Witness
revision is important for maximizing the benefit of the node
bags provided by the client and allows the DMPT to benefit
from provided nodes when a simple witness would otherwise
be rejected.
Incomplete Node Bags. The node bags from the clients
might have insufficient nodes to process a transaction if the
DMPT cache is pruned aggressively. Consider that a miner
prunes its cache after processing tx1, as shown in Figure 7. A
hash node with the hash of C’ is present in the DMPT cache,
and the miner has insufficient nodes to reconstruct the witness
for the value in node G. In such cases, the miner can tolerate
the incomplete node bags by fetching the required nodes from
the shards. Alternatively, the miner can reject the transaction,
forcing the client to perform IO.
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Figure 7: Incomplete Transactions. In this example, the tree
is pruned after applying tx1, resulting in only a hash node
for the new node C’. When tx2 arrives, there are insufficient
nodes in the node bag to reach node G, since tx2 only has the
stale node C. As a result, tx2 is incomplete, so the miner must
reject the transaction or fetch C from the bottom layer.
4.4 Examining the impact of the design
We now describe how the design affects trust, security, and
incentives. We discuss new attacks and bottlenecks result
from the design of FVCHAIN.
Trust Assumptions. FVCHAIN has the same cryptographic
assumptions as Ethereum and assumes no additional trust
between its components: the clients, miners, and the storage
nodes. Miners don’t trust clients: they re-execute the transac-
tions, verify the node bags, and can perform network I/O to
handle incomplete transactions. Miners don’t trust the stor-
age shards: miners verify their reads from the storage nodes
and compare the reads against their cache, operating without
trusting the client and the storage shards.
Storage shards do not trust miners and clients. Storage
shards verify updates from the miners, and create a new snap-
shot for the update, and thereby do not affect existing state.
Clients read data from the storage shards and can verify
their reads. Clients can resubmit transactions to other miners
if their transactions were unfairly handled by a miner.
Security. Our system assumes the same threat model as
Ethereum. Like Ethereum, FVCHAIN components are incen-
tivized to behave correctly. Some examples of incorrect behav-
ior include: clients submitting transactions with empty node
bags, storage shards sending stale witnesses which cannot be
revised, and miners rejecting transactions.
Incentives. Clients pay storage nodes for access to the authen-
ticated data. Storage nodes are incentivized to send correct
data (as clients can verify their reads) and to send recent data
(as clients can detect staleness by observing the recent state
of the system). Miners are paid through block rewards and are
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incentivized to broadcast the correct updates to storage nodes
to aid the acceptance of their block. Users can run clients (or
pay someone to run clients for them) that pre-execute and
submit transactions to the miners. Users can detect malicious
clients from the results of pre-execution and execution, which
incentivizes clients to pre-execute correctly. While we have
developed the basic ideas of this incentives solution, we have
not analyzed it rigorously: doing so would involve game the-
oretic and economic models beyond the scope of this paper.
Attacks. Storage nodes add another threat vector where min-
ers could land Denial of Service attacks on storage nodes by
sending invalid blocks and reducing their availability. How-
ever, correctness is not compromised as storage nodes identify
and reject updates with invalid blocks.
Clients can serve read only transactions without having
to rely on miners to mine those transactions. Clients can
be bombarded with empty transactions, just like miners in
Ethereum.
Bottlenecks. DMPTS provide better performance for witness
creation and verification, enabling large blocks in FVCHAIN.
Consensus protocols like Proof of Work only limit the block
creation rate, not the size of the blocks.
Large blocks, if they take higher block propagation + veri-
fication time, will cause forking, compromising the system.
DMPTS enable larger blocks by reducing the overheads in-
volved in verification.
Block advertisement time in FVCHAIN could go up signifi-
cantly. However, FVCHAIN blocks contain only transactions
(no witnesses), so advertising the block is efficient. There is
the potential for the network to become a bottleneck to adver-
tise the nodes required to verify blocks. However, miners can
control the block sizes, and thus limit the network bandwidth
used for advertising node bags.
4.5 Implementation
We implement DMPT and FVCHAIN in Typescript, targeting
node.js. The miners and storage nodes use the DMPT as a
library. The performance-critical portions of the code, such as
secp256kp1 key functions for signing transactions and gen-
erating keccak hashes, are written as C++ node.js bindings.
To execute smart contracts, we implement bindings for the
Ethereum Virtual Machine Connector interface (EVMC) and
use Hera (v0.2.2), which can run contracts implemented using
Ethereum flavored WebAssembly (ewasm) or EVMC1 byte-
code through transcompilation. Our speculative pre-executing
client is implemented in C++. The DMPT and FVCHAIN im-
plementations (15K lines of code), will be made open source.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DMPTS and
FVCHAIN. We seek to answer the following questions:
1. What is the performance of the DMPT for various opera-
tions on a single node? (§5.2)
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Figure 8: Performance of DMPT on a single node. (a) The
figure shows the absolute put and get throughput of DMPTS.
Throughput relative to the Ethereum MPT is shown on the
bars. As the number of accounts increase, DMPT throughput
increases relative to Ethereum MPT. (b) This figure shows the
memory used by DMPT and Ethereum MPT across varying
number of accounts. The trend line captures the height of the
MPT. DMPTS are orders of magnitude more memory-efficient
than Ethereum MPT. Note the log scale on the axes.
2. How does the size of the DMPT cache impact the witness
sizes, memory overhead, and rate of transaction aborts?
(§5.3)
3. What is the performance of FVCHAIN on various end-
to-end workloads that characterize the Ethereum public
blockchain? (§5.4)
5.1 Experimental Setup
We run the experiments in a cloud environment on instances
which are similar to the m4.2xlarge instance available on
Amazon EC2 with 32GB of RAM and 48 threads per node.
We use Ubuntu 18.04.02 LTS, and node.js v11.14.0. For the
end-to-end benchmarks, each storage node, miner, and client
is deployed on its own instance.
5.2 Evaluating DMPT on a single node
First, we evaluate the DMPT running on a single node. This
tests the performance of the optimized in-memory representa-
tion of DMPT. We measure the throughput of point put and
get operations for a variety of tree sizes against the state-of-
the-art Ethereum MPT.
To make a fair comparison, we compare DMPT with the
in-memory implementation of Ethereum MPT [8] that uses
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memdown [9], an in-memory implementation of a red-black
tree. We are comparing an in-memory MPT to the in-memory
DMPT. The difference in performance comes from the in-
memory representation and optimizations in DMPTS, and not
due to different storage media.
We dump the Ethereum world state every 100K blocks until
4M blocks and use it to micro-benchmark DMPTS; every key
in these benchmarks is a 160-bit Ethereum address and values
are RLP-encoded Ethereum accounts [12].
Gets. DMPTS with 1.19M accounts, obtain a get throughput
of ≈216K ops/s, that is 150× the throughput of Ethereum
MPT. The main reason for the DMPT’s better performance is
the use of in-memory pointers. To fetch a node, the DMPT sim-
ply needs to follow a path of in-memory pointers to the leaf
node. On the other hand, walking down a tree path means look-
ing up the value (node) at a particular hash for each node in
the Ethereum MPT. Even though this database is in-memory,
looking up values in an in-memory key-value map is still
more expensive than a few pointer lookups. Furthermore, the
larger the world state, the better DMPT’s in-memory Merkle
tree performs over the Ethereum MPT. This is simply because
the larger the state, the taller the tree, so the more nodes on
the path to a leaf, see Figure 8 (a).
Puts. DMPTS with 1.19M accounts obtain a put throughput
of ≈245K ops/s, that is 160x the throughput of Ethereum
MPT. Due to lazy hash resolution, a put does not need to
adjust any values in the path from the leaf to the root; in
contrast, every node in the path has to be updated in the
Ethereum MPT. put throughput in the DMPT is more than
two orders of magnitude higher than in the Ethereum MPT.
Tree Size. Figure 8 (b) shows that DMPTS are significantly
smaller than Ethereum MPTs when the same number of ac-
counts are stored. With 1.19M accounts, Ethereum MPT con-
sumes ≈26021MB and DMPTS consume ≈775MB, using
34× lesser memory. The primary reason for this is the effi-
cient in-memory representation of DMPTS. Ethereum MPT is
not-memory efficient as it uses 32-byte hashes as pointers and
relies on memdown [9] to store the flatenned MPT as key-value
pairs. The significantly reduced size of the DMPT, along with
sharding, enables DMPTS to be stored entirely in memory,
eliminating the IO bottleneck.
Lazy hash resolution. We run an experiment where we trig-
ger a root hash calculation after every N write (put or delete)
operations. As N increases, the performance of DMPT write
operations also increases. At N = 1000 (the root hash is read
every 1000 writes), DMPT is 4–5× faster than Ethereum MPT.
Since the root hash calculation is expensive (requiring RLP
serialization of nodes), performing it even once every 1000
writes reduces DMPT performance from 150× Ethereum
MPT performance to 5×.
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Figure 9: Tuning DMPT Cache Retention r. (a) This fig-
ure shows that the caching fewer levels in the cache leads
to higher memory savings (compared to storing the full tree
in memory). We do not report the memory savings of higher
values of r as they were negligible. (b) The figure shows the
reduction in witness size due to combining witnesses and
eliminating duplicates (red striped bar) and due to witness
compaction (solid bar). (c) The figure shows the impact of
r (height of cached tree) on transaction abort rate. Higher
r results in lower number of transaction aborts. Abort rate
decreases with fixed r as the total number of accounts N in-
creases, because this reduces the probability that transaction
will involve accounts that conflict at the pruned levels.
5.3 Impact of cache size
Next, we evaluate the performance of the distributed version
of the DMPT when the cache size is changed. Pruning the
cache reduces memory consumption but results in larger wit-
nesses being transmitted, and more transactions being aborted
due to insufficient witness caching. We evaluate these effects.
Memory consumption. We evaluate the reduction in the ap-
plication memory utilized, from pruning the DMPT cache,
across varying cache sizes r. Figure 9 (a) shows that lower
r will result in higher memory savings, with a tree of depth
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five consuming only 40% of the memory consumed by the
full tree. However, this means that either 1) DMPT shards
will have to provide larger witnesses or 2) the application
will experience a higher abort rate due to insufficient witness
caching.
Witness Compaction. DMPTS transmit compact witnesses
which include only the un-cached parts of the witness. DMPTS
employ node-bagging where they combine multiple witnesses
and eliminate duplicate nodes. Figure 9 (b) shows the re-
duction in witness size due to node bagging and witness
compaction, based on the height of the cached tree r. Witness
compaction and node bagging together reduce witness sizes
by up-to 95% of their original size.
Transactions. Pruning the cache discards cached witnesses.
Since transactions abort if the witnesses are not cached, this
increases the abort rate. To study the effect of varying the
cache size on transaction abort rate, we use FVCHAIN with
16 storage nodes, 1 miner, and enough clients to saturate the
miner. Transactions are generated by selecting two random
accounts from a set of N accounts. Figure 9 (c) shows that the
transaction abort rate is dependent on two factors: the DMPT
cache retention level, and the number of accounts. In partic-
ular, increasing r reduces the transaction abort rate. More
importantly, with large number of accounts N, the contention
on Merkle tree nodes reduces, reducing the abort rate for
fixed a r, making DMPTS practical for application with low
available memory.
5.4 End-to-End Blockchain Workloads
Finally, we evaluate the end-to-end performance of FVCHAIN
against synthetically generated workloads that mirror transac-
tions on the Ethereum public mainnet blockchain.
Challenges. Since Ethereum transactions are signed, the pub-
lic transactions are not conducive to experiments: we cannot
change transaction data or the source accounts, because we
do not have the secp256k1 private key. Since FVCHAIN runs
transactions at a much higher rate than Ethereum, we quickly
run into state mismatch errors, and eventually, exhaust the
available transactions.
To tackle this challenge, we analyze the public blockchain
to extract salient features, and develop a synthetic workload
generator which generates accounts with private keys we
control so our clients can run and submit signed transactions.
Synthetic Workload Generator. We analyze the transac-
tions in the Ethereum mainnet blockchain to build a synthetic
workload generator. We analyzed 100K recent (since block
7M) and 100K older blocks (between blocks 4M and 5M) in
the Ethereum blockchain to determine: 1) the distribution of
accounts involved in transactions, 2) what fraction of all trans-
actions are smart contract calls. We observe that 10-15% of
Ethereum transactions are contract calls and the rest are sim-
ple transactions. This is true of both recent blocks and older
blocks. It is also the case that a small percentage of accounts
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(b) FVChain with Geodistributed deployment
Figure 10: End-to-End Blockchain Workloads. (a) The
figure shows the scalability of DMPTS in FVCHAIN with in-
creasing number of clients and varying cache retention levels
(r). The workload used in the experiment is representative of
the account distributions in Ethereum transactions. Miners in
FVCHAIN can verify about about 30K tps with 4 clients each,
when configured at r = 7. (b) This figure shows the overall
throughput of FVCHAIN in a geodistributed deployment. Min-
ers at r = 8 can verify about 20K tps using 4 clients each,
when communicating with the DMPT across WAN.
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Figure 11: CDF of # account calls in a transaction.. This
figure shows that, consistently throughout the blockchain, few
accounts participate in the majority of transactions. Note the
log-scale on x-axis. We include data for accounts encountered
in the blocks that we analyzed.
are involved in most of the transactions. Figure 11 shows a
CDF of the number of times accounts are called, where the
accounts are sourced from the blocks we inspected. Based the
analyzed data, we generate workloads where 90% of accounts
are called 10% of the time, and 10% of the accounts are called
90% of the time. Smart contracts are invoked 15% of the time.
Throughput. Figure 10 (a) shows the transaction throughput
results. First, this figure shows that the FVCHAIN can achieve
an end-to-end verification throughput of 30,000 transactions
per sec. It also demonstrates the scalability of the DMPT and
FVCHAIN, which scales as more clients are added. By varying
the DMPT retention level at the miners from 0 to 6, the DMPT
shard throughput increases by 7x, from 1.3K ops/s to 9.4K
ops/s, increasing the scalable creation and transmission of
witnesses.
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Geo-distributed Experiment. We also ran a geo-distributed
experiment, with varying numbers of regions across 3 con-
tinents. Each region has 4 clients, 1 miner, and 16 storage
nodes, caching eight levels of the DMPT tree (r = 8). Fig-
ure 10 (b) reports the throughput experienced by the FVCHAIN.
FVCHAIN in a single region achieves a throughput of ≈25K
transactions/sec; when we scale to four regions, the through-
put drops to≈20K transactions/sec, thus retaining 80% of the
performance in a geo-distributed setting.
Contract Calls. We also ran a workload where accounts re-
peatedly call the OmiseGO Token, which is an ERC-20 token
contract [4]. Four clients repeatedly called the token contract
against a single FVCHAIN miner with DMPT cache configured
at r = 8, achieving a throughput of 17.9K±796 contract calls
per second. This demonstrates that even for pure contract con-
tract calls, FVCHAIN can provide orders of magnitude higher
transaction throughput than other blockchains.
6 Related Work
In this section, we place FVCHAIN in the context of related
work. Table 2 shows the major differences between FVCHAIN
and related work. We compare FVCHAIN to the stateless
clients proposal, HyperLedger fabric, and prior work on shard-
ing. Finally, we discuss the recent work on efficient authenti-
cated data structures in the context of DMPTS.
6.1 Ethereum’s Stateless Client
Ethereum’s stateless client proposal [19] tackles the IO bot-
tleneck at miners. It proposes inserting witnesses into the
blocks, enabling miners to verify a block without perform-
ing IO. Despite active discussion [3, 6, 11], stateless clients
have not been implemented due to practical concerns of wit-
ness sizes: witnesses for a single, simple ethereum transaction
can be ≈ 4-6KB resulting in 40-60× the network overhead
(§2). FVCHAIN handles this by using witness compaction and
node bagging to reduce the size of witnesses transmitted over
the work (by as much as 95%). FVCHAIN uses clients which
prefetch the required witnesses, removing the I/O burden on
the miners.
6.2 Pre-execution
The Hyperledger Fabric [14] is a permissioned blockchain
that optimistically executes transactions and uses signatures,
instead of witnesses, to verify the execution. However, Fabric
has special nodes that maintain the centralized state, which
can quickly become a bottleneck, as clients by design, must
contact multiple nodes to submit transactions. In contrast,
FVCHAIN is a permission-less blockchain that uses clients to
pre-fetch witnesses in parallel, eliminating the storage bottle-
neck in the speculative pre-execution of transactions.
6.3 Sharding and Consensus
We discuss sharding and novel consensus proposals in the
context of FVCHAIN. Blockchains using sharding [32, 33, 35,
Proposals
Stateless
Clients Hyperledger FVCHAIN
Permissionless 3 7 3
PoW Consensus 3 7 3
Pre-execution 7 3 3
Sharded Storage 7 7 3
Table 2: Related Work. We highlight the core differences in
the Stateless Clients proposal, Hyperledger, and FVCHAIN.
50, 56] run independent parallel chains over subsets of the
state, speeding up root calculation and shrinking witnesses.
However, sharding requires syncing the chains for consistency,
requiring expensive locking or communication protocols, po-
tentially eliminating the benefits of sharding. FVCHAIN uses
DMPTS which shard the results, instead of executing over the
sharded state [51, 57].
In the context of consensus, FVCHAIN is orthogonal to the
underlying consensus and increases the overall throughput by
increasing the number of transactions that can be included in
a block without increasing the verification time. Work that
proposes alternatives to the proof-of-work consensus [7, 15,
20, 27, 28, 28, 39, 55] are orthogonal to our work.
6.4 Dynamic Accumulators
Merkle trees are widely used in blockchains [2, 5] for witness
verification. However, the size of Merkle witnesses grow with
the increasing amount of data. Constant-sized dynamic ac-
cumulators [16] provide fixed-sized witnesses; however, the
verification throughput is low. Improving the verification rate
of constant-sized accumulators is an ongoing effort [18, 21].
In contrast, DMPTS provide both small witnesses through
witness compaction and fast verification.
7 Conclusion
Providing authenticated data scalably is a challenge in the
decentralized setting, as structures like Merkle trees, that au-
thenticate data, suffer from poor IO performance and low
scalability. As decentralized services become more popular,
their data will increase commensurately, increasing the over-
heads of data authentication. DMPTS address this limitation
by leveraging the fundamental properties of a Merkle tree
in a distributed manner: the verification and authentication
properties of the root hash allow the DMPT cache to achieve
strong consistency and the in-memory shards enable DMPTS
to achieve high scalability. FVCHAIN uses DMPTS with spec-
ulatively pre-executing clients and novel techniques like wit-
ness revision to achieve a transaction rate of over 20K tx/s in
geo distributed settings, demonstrating how DMPTS scalably
authenticate of large amounts of data. We expect future work
on cryptographic accumulators and Byzantine consensus to
improve the performance of DMPT and FVCHAIN further,
enabling practical, high performance decentralized systems
to be realized.
13
References
[1] 2005. ZFS End-to-End Data Integrity.
https://blogs.oracle.com/bonwick/
zfs-end-to-end-data-integrity.
[2] 2019. Bitcoin. https://bitcoin.org/en/.
[3] 2019. Detailed analysis of stateless client
witness size, and gains from batching and
multi-state roots. https://ethresear.ch/t/
detailed-analysis-of-stateless-client-\
witness-size-and-gains-from-batching-and-\
multi-state-roots/862.
[4] 2019. ERC20 Token Standard. https:
//theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/ERC20_Token_
Standard.
[5] 2019. Ethereum. https://github.com/ethereum/.
[6] 2019. Ethereum Improvement Proposals Repository.
https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs.
[7] 2019. Hybrid Casper FFG. https://github.com/
ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1011.md.
[8] 2019. Implementation of the modified merkle
patricia tree as specified in the Ethereum’s yel-
low paper. https://github.com/ethereumjs/
merkle-patricia-tree.
[9] 2019. In-memory abstract-leveldown store for
Node.js and browsers. https://github.com/Level/
memdown.
[10] 2019. Parity Ethereum 2.2.11-stable. https:
//github.com/paritytech/parity-ethereum/
releases/tag/v2.2.11.
[11] 2019. A possible solution to state-
less clients. https://ethresear.ch/t/
a-possible-solution-to-stateless-clients/
4094.
[12] 2019. Recursive Length Prefix Encoding. https://
github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP.
[13] Aris Anagnostopoulos, Michael T. Goodrich, and
Roberto Tamassia. 2001. Persistent Authenticated Dic-
tionaries and Their Applications. In Information Secu-
rity, George I. Davida and Yair Frankel (Eds.). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 379–393.
[14] Elli Androulaki, Artem Barger, Vita Bortnikov, Chris-
tian Cachin, Konstantinos Christidis, Angelo De Caro,
David Enyeart, Christopher Ferris, Gennady Laventman,
Yacov Manevich, et al. 2018. Hyperledger fabric: a dis-
tributed operating system for permissioned blockchains.
In Proceedings of the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference.
ACM, 30.
[15] Shehar Bano, Alberto Sonnino, Mustafa Al-Bassam,
Sarah Azouvi, Patrick McCorry, Sarah Meiklejohn,
and George Danezis. 2017. Consensus in the
Age of Blockchains. CoRR abs/1711.03936 (2017).
arXiv:1711.03936 http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.
03936
[16] Josh Cohen Benaloh and Michael de Mare. May
1994. One-way accumulators: A decentralized alter-
native to digital sinatures (extended abstract). In EURO-
CRYPT’93, volume 765 of LNCS. 274–285.
[17] Eric Biggers. 2018. fs-verity: filesystem-level integrity
protection. https://lwn.net/Articles/763441/.
[18] Dan Boneh, Benedikt Bünz, and Ben Fisch. 2019. Batch-
ing techniques for accumulators with applications to
iops and stateless blockchains. In Annual International
Cryptology Conference. Springer, 561–586.
[19] Vitalik Buterin. 2017. The Stateless Clients
Concept. https://ethresear.ch/t/
the-stateless-client-concept/172.
[20] Christian Cachin and Marko Vukolic. 2017. Blockchain
Consensus Protocols in the Wild. CoRR abs/1707.01873
(2017). arXiv:1707.01873 http://arxiv.org/abs/
1707.01873
[21] Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya. August 2002.
Dynamic accumulators and application to efficient re-
vocation of anonymous credentials. In CRYPTO 2002,
volume 2442 of LNCS. 61–76.
[22] cdetrio. 2018. Research alternatives to leveldb
(like badger). https://github.com/ethereum/
go-ethereum/issues/15717.
[23] Anrin Chakraborti, Bhushan Jain, Jan Kasiak, Tao
Zhang, Donald E. Porter, and Radu Sion. 2017. dm-
x: Protecting Volume-level Integrity for Cloud Volumes
and Local Block Devices. In Proceedings of the 8th Asia-
Pacific Workshop on Systems, Mumbai, India, Septem-
ber 2, 2017. ACM, 16:1–16:7. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3124680.3124732
[24] Jonathan Corbet. 2011. dm-verity. https://lwn.net/
Articles/459420/.
[25] Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. 1993. Pricing via Pro-
cessing or Combatting Junk Mail. In Proceedings of
the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference
on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO ’92). Springer-
Verlag, London, UK, UK, 139–147. http://dl.acm.
org/citation.cfm?id=646757.705669
14
[26] C. Chris Erway, Alptekin Küpçü, Charalampos Papa-
manthou, and Roberto Tamassia. 2015. Dynamic Prov-
able Data Possession. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.
17, 4, Article 15 (April 2015), 29 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2699909
[27] Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gun Sirer, and
Robbert Van Renesse. 2016. Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable
Blockchain Protocol. In 13th USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI
16). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 45–59.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi16/
technical-sessions/presentation/eyal
[28] Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vla-
chos, and Nickolai Zeldovich. 2017. Algorand: Scaling
Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies. In Pro-
ceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles (SOSP ’17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 51–
68. https://doi.org/10.1145/3132747.3132757
[29] Google. 2019. LevelDB. https://github.com/
google/leveldb.
[30] Alexander Heitzmann, Bernardo Palazzi, Charalampos
Papamanthou, and Roberto Tamassia. 2008. Efficient
integrity checking of untrusted network storage. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2008 ACM Workshop On Storage Se-
curity And Survivability, StorageSS 2008, Alexandria,
VA, USA, October 31, 2008, Yongdae Kim and William
Yurcik (Eds.). ACM, 43–54. https://doi.org/10.
1145/1456469.1456479
[31] Fangyong Hou, Dawu Gu, Nong Xiao, Fang Liu, and
Hongjun He. 2009. Performance and Consistency Im-
provements of Hash Tree Based Disk Storage Protection.
In International Conference on Networking, Architec-
ture, and Storage, NAS 2009, 9-11 July 2009, Zhang
Jia Jie, Hunan, China. IEEE Computer Society, 51–56.
https://doi.org/10.1109/NAS.2009.15
[32] Vitalik Buterin Joseph Poon. 2019. Plasma: Scalable
Autonomous Smart Contracts. https://plasma.io/
plasma.pdf.
[33] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly,
E. Syta, and B. Ford. 2018. OmniLedger: A Secure,
Scale-Out, Decentralized Ledger via Sharding. In 2018
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 583–
598. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2018.000-5
[34] Feifei Li, Marios Hadjieleftheriou, George Kollios, and
Leonid Reyzin. 2006. Dynamic Authenticated Index
Structures for Outsourced Databases. In Proceedings of
the 2006 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on
Management of Data (SIGMOD ’06). ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 121–132. https://doi.org/10.1145/
1142473.1142488
[35] Loi Luu, Viswesh Narayanan, Chaodong Zheng, Ku-
nal Baweja, Seth Gilbert, and Prateek Saxena. 2016. A
Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security (CCS ’16). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 17–30. https://doi.org/10.
1145/2976749.2978389
[36] Max Gillett. 2018. Block processing time slows down
following trie persistence. https://github.com/
ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/16674.
[37] Ralph C Merkle. 1987. A digital signature based on
a conventional encryption function. In Conference on
the theory and application of cryptographic techniques.
Springer, 369–378.
[38] Andrew Miller, Michael Hicks, Jonathan Katz, and
Elaine Shi. 2014. Authenticated Data Structures, Gener-
ically. In Proceedings of the 41st ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages (POPL ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
411–423. https://doi.org/10.1145/2535838.
2535851
[39] Andrew Miller, Yu Xia, Kyle Croman, Elaine Shi, and
Dawn Song. 2016. The Honey Badger of BFT Protocols.
In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’16).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 31–42. https://doi.
org/10.1145/2976749.2978399
[40] Satoshi Nakamoto et al. 2008. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer
electronic cash system. (2008).
[41] John K. Ousterhout, Arjun Gopalan, Ashish Gupta,
Ankita Kejriwal, Collin Lee, Behnam Montazeri, Diego
Ongaro, Seo Jin Park, Henry Qin, Mendel Rosenblum,
Stephen M. Rumble, Ryan Stutsman, and Stephen Yang.
2015. The RAMCloud Storage System. ACM Trans.
Comput. Syst. 33, 3 (2015), 7:1–7:55. https://doi.
org/10.1145/2806887
[42] Charalampos Papamanthou, Elaine Shi, Roberto Tamas-
sia, and Ke Yi. 2013. Streaming Authenticated Data
Structures. In Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT
2013, Thomas Johansson and Phong Q. Nguyen (Eds.).
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 353–
370.
[43] Charalampos Papamanthou, Roberto Tamassia, and
Nikos Triandopoulos. 2010. Optimal Authenticated
Data Structures with Multilinear Forms. In Pairing-
Based Cryptography - Pairing 2010, Marc Joye, Atsuko
Miyaji, and Akira Otsuka (Eds.). Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 246–264.
15
[44] Péter Szilágyi. 2018. Currently the primary bottleneck
on go-ethereum is disk IO. https://github.com/
ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/15857.
[45] Péter Szilágyi. 2018. Efficient Garbage Collec-
tion to reduce state on disk and increase the block
processing rate. https://github.com/ethereum/
go-ethereum/pull/16810.
[46] Xiaoyao Qian. 2018. Improved authenticated data struc-
tures for blockchain synchronization. Ph.D. Disserta-
tion.
[47] Pandian Raju, Rohan Kadekodi, Vijay Chidambaram,
and Ittai Abraham. 2017. PebblesDB: Building Key-
Value Stores using Fragmented Log-Structured Merge
Trees. In Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles (SOSP ’17). Shanghai,
China.
[48] Pandian Raju, Soujanya Ponnapalli, Evan Kaminsky,
Gilad Oved, Zachary Keener, Vijay Chidambaram, and
Ittai Abraham. 2018. mLSM: Making Authenticated
Storage Faster in Ethereum. In 10th USENIX Workshop
on Hot Topics in Storage and File Systems (HotStorage
18). USENIX Association, Boston, MA.
[49] Vitalik Buterin. 2014. Toward a 12-second Block
Time. https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/11/
toward-a-12-second-block-time/.
[50] Marko Vukolic´. 2015. The quest for scalable blockchain
fabric: Proof-of-work vs. BFT replication. In Interna-
tional workshop on open problems in network security.
Springer, 112–125.
[51] Michael Wei, Amy Tai, Christopher J Rossbach, Ittai
Abraham, Maithem Munshed, Medhavi Dhawan, Jim
Stabile, Udi Wieder, Scott Fritchie, Steven Swanson,
et al. 2017. vcorfu: A cloud-scale object store on
a shared log. In 14th {USENIX} Symposium on Net-
worked Systems Design and Implementation ({NSDI}
17). 35–49.
[52] Jeffrey Wilcke. 2016. The Ethereum net-
work is currently undergoing a DoS attack.
https://ethereum.github.io/blog/2016/09/
22/ethereum-network-currently-undergoing-\
dos-attack/.
[53] Gavin Wood et al. 2019. Ethereum: A secure decen-
tralised generalised transaction ledger. (2019).
[54] Renlord Yang, Toby Murray, Paul Rimba, and Udaya
Parampalli. 2019. Empirically Analyzing Ethereum’s
Gas Mechanism. 310–319. https://doi.org/10.
1109/EuroSPW.2019.00041
[55] Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K Reiter,
Guy Golan Gueta, and Ittai Abraham. 2018. HotStuff:
BFT Consensus in the Lens of Blockchain. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1803.05069 (2018).
[56] Mahdi Zamani, Mahnush Movahedi, and Mariana
Raykova. 2018. RapidChain: Scaling Blockchain via
Full Sharding. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity (CCS ’18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 931–948.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243853
[57] Tao Zhu, Zhuoyue Zhao, Feifei Li, Weining Qian,
Aoying Zhou, Dong Xie, Ryan Stutsman, Haining
Li, and Huiqi Hu. 2018. Solar: towards a shared-
everything database on distributed log-structured stor-
age. In 2018 {USENIX} Annual Technical Conference
({USENIX}{ATC} 18). 795–807.
16
